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,_fHE SUPREME COURT
OF rfHE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 9971

-vs-

JEAN SINCLAIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Respondent's Brief in Answer to
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing

PRELI~1IINARY

STATEMENT

The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following
brief in answer to the appellant's petition for rehearing. It
is submitted that the appellant is still unable to grasp the
rule of appellate review that the evidence will be viewed in
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Secondly, appellant refers to the case as a capital case. Indeed, many
good arguments can be made for imposition of the maximum penalty in this case; however, the case as it now stands
before the court is non-capital. There is no rule requiring
an appellant court to make any different review of a case on
appeal when the crime is murder. Each criminal case is
entitled to a review for misapplication of law and a review
of the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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diet. It is submitted that the opinion and judgment of the
court is proper when so viewed and that there is no merit to
the appellant's petition for rehearing.
POINT I
THE COURT'S OPINION IS A FAIR AND PROPER APPRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED IN A LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT.

(a) The record clearly supports the statement in the
court's opinion that the police received a tip from LaRae
Peterson to look to Jean Sinclair as respects the killing of
Don Foster. Officer Glen Cahoon testified that he had a
phone conversation ·with LaRae Peterson on the 5th of
January, 1963, at about 2:00p.m., in the afternoon after
Foster was killed, directing him to Jean Sinclair (R. 13381339). This, consequently, was a factor corroborative of
Sinclair's participation in the crime, since LaRae Peterson
was aware of the feelings Sinclair had concerning Foster
and had been present at the time Foster was killed.
(b) The court's opinion states that Jean Sinclair was
dressed "in gray men's pants, had on boots, and had a tan
trench coat wrapped around the gun." The appellant contends that the record does not support this statement. The
record, at page 580, clearly shows:
"A. And light gray flannel pants. I believe a white shirt and
a belt, although I don't remember which belt, and a blue parka,
reversible parka, whatever you call them."

Further, it is admitted that Kuehne mentioned that the
coat was "white" (R. 579, 584); however, in response to
the district attorney's question, Kuehne indicated it was a
"light coat" (R. 581). In addition, in response to a quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion from the district attorney to describe the coat, Kuehne
stated ( R. 585) :
"Q. !"{o"', will you drsnibe the trench coat for us?
A. It was quite similar to this one that's hanging over here.
Q. You mean this one right here?
.\. Yes, except a slightly different grade of material, I believe.
Q. Different grade of material, but approximately the same
color?
A. That's right.
Q. Either a white or a light beige then, is that correct?
A. That's right."

A coat, therefore, was picked out that was light, either
white or tan. The cleaners where Miss Sinclair took a coat
stated there was virtually no difference between beige and
tan. This should be compared with the testimony of LaMar
Williams ( R. 981 ) , who testified the person he saw ( resembling Jean Sinclair) was wearing a "light" coat. Boyd K.
Harvey described the coat of the person he saw running
away as a "light colored" coat ( R. 986) . Clearly, therefore, the evidence is even more unfavorable to appellant
than she would like the court to believe. Various shades
may be described in different ways, depending on the person. The weight of the testimony is still a matter for the
jUry.

(c) The court's statement that Jean Sinclair was seen
driving around with Kuehne to find a vantage point to kill
Foster is somewhat inaccurate, but merely combines two
facts. First, Kuehne and Sinclair did ride around in an
automobile while Sinclair looked for a spot to kill Foster
(R. 540, 541) . They were not observed together at this
time, although, as counsel for appellant points out, they
were together with Vaughn Humphries in an automobile
a few months before the killing. However, Miss Sinclair's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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car was seen by LaVon Turner, Don Foster's mother, circling around her house when LaRae Peterson and Foster
were at her house for dinner (R. 1603). Further, LaRae
Peterson testified that she and Foster were followed on
occasion ( R. 778) and Jean Sinclair had asked Vaughn
Humphries to follow Foster and Peterson (R. 735). At best,
the difference is a slight one and in no way is such as to
warrant any of appellant's claim.
(d) The appellant contends the court's statement (page
3 of appellant's brief), relating to the testimony of LaMar
Williams, is inaccurate. Appellant's position is not true.
The record clearly and authoratively supports the court's
statement. The appellant refuses to give a fair treatment to
the testimony of Mr. Williams. It is clear that Jean Sinclair was dressed very similar to the way the person running
away from the scene of the crime was dressed. She was described as wearing darker clothing or trousers and a light
coat ( R. 980-981 ) . It is clear from Williams' testimony
that he described the trousers as being darker than the light
coat, which is identical to the way Kuehne and Boyd Harvey described the clothing of Jean Sinclair.
In response to the contention that the individual that
Mr. Williams saw weighed 165 to 180 pounds, he estimated
this to be "with the clothing they were wearing" (R. 983).
It should be remembered that Jean Sinclair was wearing a
heavy parka, shirt and trousers, and, with a trench coat
over the parka, a manlike resemblance would very easily
have looked the weight that was estimated.
Contrary to the appellant's assertion in the petition for
rehearing, Mr. Williams clearly identified Miss Sinclair:
"Q. Now, I'll ask you if after this particular time you have seen
anyone who resembles the person's features that you saw that
night?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A Yes, I have seen someone who resembles the features.
Q. And who is that person?
A. That is the defendant, Jean Sinclair." (R. 980)

Further, the witness did not withdraw his identification of
Miss Sinclair as to the structure of her face. Thus, in response to a question by counsel, asking where the particular
"S-curve" was in Miss Sinclair's face, the following occurred:
"Q. (By Mr. Hatch) Where is the S-curve, as you put it?
A. Directly underneath the lower lip, sir. (R. 982)

Additionally, appellant's assertion that Mr. Williams
only saw Miss Sinclair through the rear-view mirror is entirely incorrect since the record discloses that he stated:
"A. I saw this person coming from the archway to my east from
where my car was parked." (R. 979)

.\clmittedly, he indicated that he saw her through the rearview mirror, but a fair reading of the testimony is that he
saw her walk from the archway past his car, and saw her
after she had passed the car by looking through the rearview mirror. The record is clear that he had a full view
of ~I iss Sinclair.
Finally, the area where Mr. Williams saw Miss Sinclair
is definitely nowhere near a full block from the place the
shooting occurred. The distance is merely one tier of apartments over from the apartment area where Don Foster
lived and would at best be a few hundred feet.
~Ir. \Villiams' testimony fully demonstrates the corroborative effect of the evidence.
(e) The court's statement as to what Mr. Boyd K. Har\·ey testified to is absolutely correct. Mr. Harvey described
the person as wearing a "three quarter length light colored
car coat" \ R. 986). He indicated that the coat broke in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the area of the knees. The appellant has carefully left from
page 4 of her brief the color of the coat, since it obviously
is similar to what Mr. Williams and Karl Kuehne described
the coat to be.
Appellant's assertion that the statement as to the car
is inaccurate is erroneous since the court indicates that Mr.
Harvey described the car which he saw the person get into
as being a two-tone car. Further the record clearly supports
the fact that the defendant owned a two-tone car, also of a
General Motors make.
(f) The appellant's position on the testimony of Mr.
and Mrs. Pieter Combee at page 5 of her brief is ridiculous.
Mr. and Mrs. Combee's testimony is clearly to the effect
that LaRae Peterson cried out, "Oh, God, she killed him"
(R. 1229, 1240). Although LaRae Peterson testified that
she said, "Oh my God, he's been shot," the jury was free to
believe whomever they desired and since LaRae Peterson
was anything but a friendly witness to the State's position,
the jury was certainly justified in believing independent and
unbiased witnesses.
Once again, this is simply the inability of the appellant
to accept the proper basis for review on appeal, that the
evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
Further, although the opinion of the court mentions that
the Combee's home was directly immediately west of the
Susan Kay Arms, the home is immediately south and west
of the parking area where Don Foster was killed and is
adjacent to it .
.(g) The appellant, in commenting on the testimony of
the cleaners, is completely distorting the record. As noted
above, all of the witnesses were in general agreement as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the color of the coat that Miss Sinclair took to the cleaners.
Kuehne said it could be either white or beige. The two witnesses who obseiVed Miss Sinclair at the scene of the shooting described the coat as a light coat. All the witnesses
picked out the same coat which was in the courtroom. Mr.
\\'illiams described the trousers as "darker trousers" (R.
980-981) but only in reference to being darker than the
coat. This is exactly in accord with Kuehne's testimony and
the other witnesses, indicating that Miss Sinclair was wearing darker colored trousers.
Joyce Harris, who testified as to Miss Sinclair's bringing
the clothing in to be laundered, described the coat as being
''a tan trench coat" (R. 992), and identified the same coat
as Kuehne had identified in the courtroom as being similar
in color ( R. 993) . Further, she described the coat as a
"three quarter length coat" (R. 993). She did not mention
at any time that the coat was a whipcord coat but described
it as a trench coat. Further, Miss Harris indicated that
there was little difference between a beige and tan coat ( R.
997).
Additionally, it should be noted that Mr. Allred testified
that it was an overcoat and tan, and picked out the same
coat that the other witnesses had identified as being similar
(R. 1001, 1002) . He testified further that there were grease
and dirt stains on the clothing.
Finally, Officer Alex Paul described the coat as a three
quarter length tan trench coat which was quite dirty (R.
1007).
• Obviously, therefore, the court's statement is fully and
fairly corroborated by the record.
(h) Finally, the appellant indicates that Mrs. Combee's
identification of Jean Sinclair was only from a right rear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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view and that she never saw the face. This again is erroneous and is a misstatement of the record. Thus, Mrs. Combee
testified:
"Q. All you saw was the jacket, is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct, and her face/' (R. 916)

Additionally, she made it very clear that she had seen
Miss Sinclair ( R. 918, Lines 14 through 18) .
An analysis of the appellant's objections to the court's
opinion discloses that appellant has done the very thing
which she contends the court did, that is, she has failed to
view the evidence in total and has fly-specked portions of
the opinion and taken matters out of context in an effort to
support her position. The court's opinion clearly was based
upon factors directly in the record and is thoroughly supported by items of testimony in evidence which the jury
considered and could have well felt crucial.
POINT II
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE KARL
KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY.

In Point II of appellant's brief, appellant re-argues the
same issue which was argued in the main portion of her
brief, that there is insufficient evidence to corroborate the
testimony of Karl Kuehne. The court is directed to the
brief of respondent, State of Utah, heretofore filed with the
court, pages 15 through 23, which, it is submitted, clearly
refutes the contention of the appellant.
( 1 ) Mrs. Kuehne's testimony as to Miss Sinclair's statement that Karl Kuehne could get some money fast is a factor which, when considered with the presence of motive,
malice, and other matters of record, lends weight to the
conclusion that Jean Sinclair killed Don Foster.
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( ~) The fact that Miss Sinclair's car was seen following
LaRae Peterson and Don Foster, and the fact that she had
asked Vaughn Humphries to follow them is an additional
corroborative fact which, when taken with other evidence,
amply supports the court's determination. The testimony
of LaMar B. Williams was to the effect that he saw a person
resembling Jean Sinclair in the vicinity of the scene of the
crime shortly before it occurred. The clothing which she
was wearing, as he saw it, was similar to the clothing which
Boyd Harvey described as being worn by the person who
ran away immediately after the shooting. Further, Mr.
Harvey's identification of a two-tone automobile and the
fact that Miss Sinclair owned such an automobile is an additional matter of corroborative evidence.
(3) The testimony of the employees of the cleaning establishment, that Miss Sinclair brought clothing into the
establishment the next day for cleaning, which clothing was
similar to the clothing LaMar Williams and Boyd Harvey
identified the person to be wearing at the scene of the crime,
is also corroborative. Further, the spots on the clothing are
corroborative of being near automobiles on a hard-topped
surface which is the nature of the surface at the Susan Kay
Arms where the automobiles were parked.
(4) Mrs. Combee's identification of the defendant is
clearly borne out by the record. The appellant's assertion
that State v. Sommers, 97 U. 132, 90 P.2d 273 ( 1939), is
somehow contrary to the court's opinion is erroneous, since
in that opinion the court expressly noted that the presence
of an individual in the vicinity of a crime may be persuasive
of the individual's connection with the crime. The court
stated:
"* * * This may, under some circumstances, be persuasive of
accused's connection with the burning of the building,* * *."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although the court in that case found that the presence of
the accused was not corroborative, it was only because the
accused lived in the area and had an otherwise exculpatory
reason for his presence. There was no reason for Miss Sinclair's presence. She did not live in the area and, in fact, at
one point stated that she had never been there. Consequently, this factor is directly corroborative.
Finally, the appellant's assertion that somehow there is
no evidence sufficient to show an intense relationship between LaRae Peterson and Jean Sinclair is simply absurd,
since the record overwhelmingly shows the nature of the
relationship and the intensity of the feeling between LaRae
Peterson and Jean Sinclair, and the appellant simply refuses to recognize the evidence and, in begging the court to
ignore it, asks the court to commit error. Further, the relationship between LaRae Peterson and Jean Sinclair is
another factor relevant to the fact that Miss Sinclair committed the crime. Reliance upon The Matter of the Contempt of LaRae Peterson, 386 P.2d 727 ( 1963), to contend
that the testimony is not important, is misplaced. In that
case the court expressly noted that the relationship "might
have a tendency to prove motive for such an act" and as is
noted in 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 812 (4) and State
v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 212 P. 504 ( 1922), motive when
coupled with other evidence may be corroborative of the
commission of the crime by the person charged.
POINT III
THE OTHER POINTS IN APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

Appellant contends that the law of corroboration would
be changed by the court's opinion. This is not so. The court
correctly states the test to be applied, weighs the evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and when the evidence and the test are examined against
other valid precedents (see respondent's brief, pages 15
through 23), the opinion of the court is clearly correct.
The appellant's assertion that the Contempt of LaRae
Peterson, 386 P.2d 727 ( 1963), involves the same situation
as this case simply is not correct. An entirely different principle was involved and the court clearly recognized the relevancy of such evidence to the Sinclair case and merely determined that Mrs. Peterson had a privilege which overrode the usual rules of relevancy and materiality. As noted
previously in respondent's brief, the privilege is exclusively
that of a witness and the defendant may not claim benefit
by it.
Finally, it should be noted that numerous points in the
appellant's brief were frivolous, legally unmeritorious and
would add nothing to the state of the law. Consequently,
the court was correct in not unduly burdening the opinion
with the points.
Further, the fact that the opinion may treat points raised
by the appellant with less literary force than she would have
does not mean that the court did not thoroughly consider
each of the points.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant's petition
for rehearing is patently without merit. It attacks the
court's opinion without justification in numerous instances,
misquotes the record and cites authorities out of context,l
There is, therefore, absolutely no basis which would warrant this court in granting a petition for rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,

A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

An example of this is the appellant's citation of State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178,
for the position that the conduct of the jury foreman and Mrs. Com~ee was
prejudicial error. It suffices to note that the Crank case did not cons1de~ !he
issue of juror misconduct for error and, as the court points out in the opm10n
heretofore issued, was speaking of what ought to be and not what warrants re·
versal. Finally, appellant refuses to recognize the case of State v. McNaughtan,
92 U. 114, 66 P.2d 137 (1937), where, in an identical case, this court ruled
that there was no prejudicial error.
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